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Abstract
A situation in which players can generate certain pay-offs by cooperating
can be described by a coopemtive gnme with transferable utililies. In this paper
we assume that the players who are participating in such a game, are part
of some permission structure. This means that there are players who need
permission from one or more other players before they can act or cooperate
with other players to generate some pay-ofí. It is clear that such a permission
structure limits the possibilities of cooperation. We derive a modified game
that takes account of these limited cooperation possibilities. We then give
axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value of this modified game.
1 Introduction
I'layers in a finite player set N w}ro are participating in a cooperative game with
LrausCerable utilities - or simply a TU-game - are mostly assumed to be socially
syrnnictric~. '1'hey only differ with respect Lo their abilities to Iet coalitions obtain
certain pay-offs as represented by a characteristicfunetion v: 2N --a R with v((~) - 0,
where R denotes the set of real numbers. In the sequel the collection of all TU-
games represented by their characteristic function is denoted by CN. Many authors
have developed models that introduce social asymmetries between players in such
TU-games. In, e.g., Aumann and Drèze (1974), Owen (1977), and Winter (1989),
the players are assumed to be part of some coalition structure which influences the
possibilities of cooperation and coalition formation. Another social difference that
can be considered is the introduction of limited communication possibilities of the
players. For this we refer to Myerson (1977), Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1978),
Owen (1986), and Borm, Owen and Tijs (1990), where the limited communication
structure is represented by an undirected graph.
In this paper we consider another social feature of players which influences
the possibilities of cooperation in a TU-game. We assume that there are players
wlio have veto power over the actions undertaken by certain other players. Such a
social organisation is represented by a mapping which assigns to every player the
collection of players, whose actions he can veto, i.e., the. players that reyuire his
permission for their actions. A situation in which players can obtain certain pay-offs
by cooperation but in which some players need permission from their superiors before
they can cooperate is described by what we call a game with a permission structure.
These games are introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1991). We assume-2
tlrat every player needs permission from all oí his superiors. T}ris interpretation of
the permission structure is referred to as the Conjunctive approach'.
[n section 2 we describe games with permission structures. We derive a modi-
ficd TLJ-game frorn such a game with a pcrmission structure in which we take account
uf thc limited possibilitics of cooperation determined by the permission structure.
Furtherrnore we introduce an allocation rule for these games with permission struc-
tures. An allocation rule is a mapping which assigns to every game with a permission
structure a distribution of the pay-offs over the players. The allocation rule that we
consider assigns to every game with permission structure the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)) oí the modified game. This allocation rule is referred to as the Conjunc-
tivc permission value and is shown to be an extension of the Shapley value to the
collection of games with permission structures.
In section 3 we give an axiomatizationof this Conjunctive permission value. In
this axiomatization an important role is played by the class of monotone TU-games.
A TU-game v is called monotone if for all E C F C N it holds that v(E) G v(F).
'i'he collcction of all monotone 'I'U-garnes is denoted by GNy.
We remark that there can occur `domination cycles' in permission structures.
Such a`domination cycle' is a group of players that can be ordered such that each
player, except the first one, needs permission from the previous player, while the first
player needs permission from the last one. In section 4 we concentrate on the subclass
of permission structures in which these `domination cycles' do not occur.
2 Games with a permission structure
In this paper we assume that the cooperation possibilities of a firrite group of players
are limited because some players might need permission from one or more other
players. Formally such a permission structure is described as follows.
Definition 2.1 Let N 6e afináte player set. A mapping S: N-~ 2N is a permission
structure on N iJ it is asymmetric on N, i.e., jor every i, j E N it holds that
if j E S(i) then i~ S( j).
The collection oj all permission structures on N is denoted by SN.
'[n Gilles and Owen (1991) it is assumed that every player needs permission from nt teast one
of his direct superiors. This is referred to as the Disjunctiue approach.-3-
The players j E S(i) are called the successors of i E N in S E SN. (Note that
asymmetry of S implies that i~ S(i) for all i E N.) A permission structure S E SN
can be represented alternatively by the pair (N, RS) where RS is the óinary relation
given by
Rs:-{(i,j)ENxN~jES(i)}.
For each permission structure S E SN we now define the mapping S: N~ 2l`' as
follows:
S(i) :- {j E N ~ (i, j) E tr(RS)},
where tr(RS) indicates the transitive closure of Rst. The players in S(i), i E N, are
called the subordinates of i in S and the players in S-~(i) :- {j E N ~ i E S(j)}
are called the superiors of i in S. Furthermore we define for every E C N, S(E) :-
UiEE S( i) and S(E) :- ~J;EE S(i). Although a player cannot be a successor of himself
he can be a subordinate of himself. If we want to exclude these kind of `domination
cycles' then we must add another condition with respect to the mapping S.
Definition 2.2 Let N be a finite player set. A permission structure S E SN is
acyclic on N if for every i E N it holds that i~ S(i).
The collection of all acyclic permission structures on N is denoted by SÁ .
In the Conjunctive approach with respect to permission structures we assume that a
player needs permission from all his superiors before he can act. This means that a
coalition E C N is formable if and only if all superiors of the players in E are also
part of E, i.e., S-~(E) C E.
Definition 2.3 Let S E SN. The sovereign part of E C N according to S is the
coalitíon given by
a(E) :- E `S(N `E).
The authorizing set of E C N according to S is the coalition given 6y
n(E) :- E u S-'(E).
1The transit~ae closure tr(R) of a binary relation R C N x N is given by: (i, j) E tr(R) if and
only if there exists a sequence {hk}~~k~,,, such that hl - i, (hk,ht}1) E R for all 1 G k G m- 1
and h,,, - j. --4-
The sovereign part of E consists of those players in E whose superiors are all part
of I;. '1'his meaus that Q(E) is thc largest subcoalition of E that is formable. The
authorizing set of E consists of E together with all its superiors. Thus o(E) is the
smallest formable coalition t}iat contains E. Using the notion of sovereign part we
can transform the game v E 9N so that we take account of the permission structure
S in the following way.
Definition 2.4 Let v E~N and S E SN. The Conjunctive restriction of v on S
is the game 1Z5(v) E G~ that is given 6y
TZs(v)(E) :- v(~(E)) for all E C N.
For properties of the inapping ~ZS: GN -~ ~N we refer to Gilles, Owen and van den
Brink (1991).
In the sequel a triple (N, v, S) with v E GN and S E S`~ will be indi-
cated as a game witla a permission structure. An allocation rule for games with
a permission structure is a mapping that assigns to every game with a permis-
sion structure (N, v, S) a distribution of the pay-offs that are attainable in the re-
stricted game RS(v). In the following sections we concentrate on the allocation rule
y~: N x GN x SN -~ R that is given by
cp(i, v, S) :- Sh;(7ZS(v)) for all i E N, v E ~N and S E SN,
where for every i E N, Sh;(v) is the 5hapley value of player i in game v E GN, i.e,
Sh;(v) - ~ (~N - ~E)!(~E - 1)! (v(E) - v(E ~ {i})).
r.:3~ (~N)~
The allocation rule y~ is referred to as the Conjunctive permission value. If we take
the trivial mapping S0 E SN which is given by S0(i) - 0 for all i E N, then it
is easy to see tliat the restriction 1ZSe(v) is equal to the original game v. Thus the
Conjunctive permission value y~ is a generalizationof the Shapley value for TU-games.
For computing the Conjunctive permission value of a game with permission structure
we derive the following formula.
Proposition 2.5 Let v E~N, S E SN and for every i E N
I'; :- {E c N ~ E n[S(i) u {i}] ~ 0}.5
Then
S~(~~ v, S) - ~ ~~(E)
EEr~ ~~(E)'
where the divídends 0„(E) are given by (see Harsanyi (1959JJ
Ov(E) .- ~ (- 1)~E-~FV(F).
FCE
PROOF
Let v E~`v and S E SN. In Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1991) it is proved that
the restriction 7Zs(v) can be written as
~s(v) - ~ ~ 0~(E) ~ nF,
FCN ECN
F-a(F) a(E)-F
where uF is the unanimity game of F C N, i.e.,
- f I ifr~F
uF(l;)
Sl 0 else
From the additivity property of the Shapley value it then follows that







(i) F- a(F) if and only if there is an E C N such that a(F,) - F, and
(ii) i E a(E) if and only if E E I';
it holds that
Dv(E) 4~(i, v, S) - Sh;(7Zs(v)) - E~ ~~(E).
Q.E.D.
Example 2.6 Consider the permission structure S: N-~ 2N on N- { 1, ..., 5}
which is given by:6
S(1) -{2,3,4}, S(2) -{4,5}, S(3) - S(4) - S(5) - 0.
This acyclic permission structure can be represented by the following directed graph
Cousider the coalition {1,3,4}. The sovereign part and authorizing seL of this coali-
tion respectively are given by a({1,3,4}) -{1,3} and a({1,3,4}) -{1,2,3,4}.
Let v E~N be the additive game given by: v(E) -~E for all E C N.
It is easy to see that the Shapley value of this game is given by Sh;(v) - 1 for all
iEN.
The restriction of v on S is the game 7Zs(v) given by
~s(v)(E) - v(~(~)) - ~~(E).
So, for example, Rs(v)({1,3,4}) - v({1,3}) - 2.
The Conjunctive perrnission value of the game with permission structure (N, v, S) is
givcn by
~P(', v, S) - 6(16, 7, 3, 2, 2).
Comparing c,~ with the Shapley value of game v we see that a substantial shift in the
distribution of the pay-offs occurs. Especially the `topman', player 1, gets a lot more
because of his strong position in the permission structure S.
We conclude this section by introducing some concepts that will be used in the
axiomatizations that are discrrssed in the following sections.
Definition 2.7 The allocation rule f: N x CN x SN --~ R is efficient if for every
v E~N and every S E SN it holds that
~ f(i,v,S)-v(N).
iEN-7-
'I'hc allr~ralin,r rulr J: N X C~N X SN ~ R is additive if for evcry i E N, 7J,w E GN
and S E SN it holds that
f(i, v, S) f f (i, w, S) - f(i, v f w, S).
Finally we indicate a special class of players that play an important role in all ax-
iomatizations that we give in the following sections.
Definition 2.8 Let v E~N. A player j E N is necessary in v if for every E C
N~{ j} it holds that v( E) - 0.
"I'he next result shows that a necessary player in a monotone garne is assigned the
highest pay-ofl' in the Shapley value of that monotone game.
Proposition 2.9 Let v E~,y and let j E N be a necessary player in v. Then it
holds that
Shj(v) ~ Sh;(v) for all i E N.
PROOF
I.et j E N be a necessary player in the monotone game v. Then for every i E N the
following properties hold:
(i) Let E~{i, j}. Since v(E `{j}) - 0 by j being a necessary player in v and
v(E` {i}) 7 v(~) - 0 by monotonicity of v it holds that v(E) -v(E` {j}) -
v(E) ) v(E) - v(E ` {i}).
(ii) If i E E and j ~ E then v(E) - v(E `{i}) - 0.
(iii) If i ~ E and j E E then v(E) - v(E` {j}) - v(E) 1 0.
Using the fact that y(E) :- l~N-;íeEl~~~E-'~~ ) 0 for all E C N we can deduce that:
~~N).





1 ~ g(E)(v(E) - v(E ~ {i}))
E~{i,;}




3 An axiomatization of the Conjunctive permis-
sion value
In this section we give a set of axioms that uniquely determine the Conjunctive
permission value for games with permission structures. First we introduce a special
type of player in games with a permission structure.
Definition 3.1 l,et v E r~N and S E SN. Player j E N is weakly inessential
in (N,v,S) if every h E S(j) U{j} is a dummy player in gaTne v, i.c., for every
Ic E S( j) U{ j} it holds that
v(E) - v(E `{h}) for all E C N.
A player thus is weakly inessential if he himself as well as all his subordinates have
no individual abilities because they are dummy players in the original game v. The
following lemma will be used in Theorem 3.3 as well as in Theorem 4.4.
Lemma 3.2 Let S E SN and let a(F,) be the sovereign part of E C N according to
S'. 'lhen
a(E) `[S(j) U{j}[ - o-(E` {j}) for all j E N.
PROOF
Let S E SN and j E N. Then
a(~;) ~ [S(j) U {j}] - [F, ~ S(N ~ E)] ~ [S'(j) U {j}]
- [E ` {j}] `[S(N ` E) U S(j)]
- [E~{j}]~S(N~[E~{j}])-Q(E~{j})
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.3 The allocation rule f: N x G'~ x SN -~ R is equal to the Conjunctive
permission value cp if and only if it is ef,fccient, additive, and satisfies the following
three conditions:-9




for every player i E N it holds that
f(z~v,S) - Ï(Z,v,S-i)~
eular.re S-~ E S~ is givcn Gy: S-~(i) :- S(i) ~{j} for all i E N
2. If S E SN and player j E N is such that S(j) ~ ~, then for every v E L~Ny it
holds that
f(j, v, S) ? max f(i, v, S)
iES(J)
.i. If v E G,f and j E N is a necessary player in v, then for every S E SN it holds
that
f( j, v, S) ? f(i, v, S) for all i E N.
PROOF
We first prove that ~p is efficient, additive and satisfies the three conditions. Let S
be a given permission structure.
~ Lct v E GN. It is easy to see that N - Q(N). Thus 1Z5(v)(N) - v(a(N)) -
v(N). From the efiiciency property of the Shapley value for TU-games it then
[ollows that ~;EN y~(i, v, S) -~,EN Sh;(RS(v)) - v(N). Thus ~p is efficient.
~ Let v, w E t~N. Then for all E C N it holds that
~s(v)(E) ~ ~s(w)(E) - v(~(E)) ~ w(~(E)) -
- (v -~ w)(o(E)) - ~Zs(v ~ w)(E).
Additivity of ~ then follows from additivity of the Shapley value for TU-games.-10-
~ I,et v E ~N and let j E N be a weakly inessential player in (N, v, S). With
Lemma 3.2 and the fact that every h E S(j) U{j} is a dummy player in game
v it then follows that
~s(v)(E) - v(~(E)) - v(~(E) ~ ~S(j) U {j}~)
- v(v(E~ {j})) - Rs(v)(E~ {j}) for all E C N.
This implies that
(i) 4~(j, v, S) - Sh;(Rs(v)) - 0~
(ii) Rs(v)(E) - Rs-~(v)(E) for all E C N, and thus cp(i, v, S) - cp(i, v, S-j)
for all i E N.
Thus c,~ satisfies condition 1.
~ Let v E~,~, S E ~SN, j E N and i E S(j). Then we can state that
(i) Let F, ~ {i, j}. Since Q(E `{j}) C o(E `{i}) and v is monotone it
follows that
7Zs(v)(E) - 1Zs(v)(E ~ {j}) - v(a(E)) - v(a(E ~ {j}))
~ v(Q(E) - v(Q(E ~ {i}))
- ~s(v)(E) - ~s(v)(E ` {i}),
(ii) If i E E and j ~ E, then Rs(v)(E) - Rs(v)(E ` {i}) - 0.
(iii) If i ~ E and j E E then 1Zs(v)(E) - 1Zs(v)(E `{j}) ~ 0 by 1Zs(v)
being monotone.
With this and taking w- Rs(v) E ~Ny it follows that
Shj(w) - ~ g(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {j})) f ~ g(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {j}))
E~{i,j} Ei~
E3j
~ ~ y(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {i})) } ~ g(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {i}))
E~{i,j} E3~
E~j
- Sh;(w).- 11 -
Thus c,~ satisfies condition 2.
~ l.et v E ~M and let j E N be a necessary player in v. Because o(E) C E it
holds that 7ZS(v)(E) - v(v(E)) - 0 for all E C N`{j}. Thus j is a necessary
player in RS(v). Since ~ZS(v) E GNy as shown in Gilles, Owen and van den
Brink (1991) it follows from Proposition 2.9 that cp(j,v,S) - Sh~(1ZS(v)) 1
Sh;(RS(v)) - cp(i, v, S) for all i E N.
Now suppose that f: N x CN x SN --~ R is efficient, additive and satisfies the three
conditions stated in the theorem.
Consider the game wT - cTUT where uT is the unanimity game of T C N and cT ~ 0




and let S be a permission structure on N. Clearly wT is a monotone game. Then




- I `T if i E a(T)
~P(2, wT, S) SI ~~IT1
0 else
We now show that f must be equal to cp. Consider the permission structure S': N-~
2N that is given by
S'(i) :- S(i) (1 ~(T) for all i E N.
Clearly S'(i) C S(i) for all i E N. Suppose that j E S(i) ~ S'(i) for some i E N.
Thcn j~ ~r('I')- This implies that
(i) j~ T and thus j is a dummy player in the game wT;
(ii) S(j) f1 T- 0. This means that for every h E S(j) it holds that h~ T and
thus h is a dummy player in wT.
Eac1i player j E N for which there exists an i E N such that j E S(i) `S'(i) thus is
weakly inessential in (N, wT, S). According to condition 1(ii) it then holds that-12
f(1, ~T, S`) - f( i, wT, S) for all i E N. (1)
Next we determine f(i, wT, S"). Therefore we distinguish exactly three cases with
respect to playcr j E N.
1. Suppose that j E T.
Then j is necessary in the monotone game wT and thus, according to condition
3, f( j, wT, S') ? f(i, wT, S' ) for all i E N. Thus there exists a constant c~ 0
such that
f(j,wT,S')-c forall j ET
and (2)
f(i, wT, S') C c for all i E N`T
2. Suppose that j E a(T) `T.
Then S"(j) ~ 0. By definition of S' it holds that max;ES.(j) f(i,v,S`) -
max.ES,(j) f( i, v, S'). Because wT is monotone it follows with condition 2 that
f(?, wT, S~ ) J max f(i, wT, S` ).
~ES~(j)
1~rom (2) and the fact that S`(j) fl T~ 0 it then follows that f( j, uT, S') - c
for all j E a(T) `T.
3. Suppose that j E N`a(T).
Then j is a dummy player in wT and S'(j) -~. Thus j is weakly inessential
iu ( N, 2o-i~, S` ) and t,hus it follows fro~n condition 1(i) thaL f( j, wT, S') - 0 for
all j E N `a(7').
With (L) it then follows that
f(Z,~llT, S) - f(Z,wT,S~) - ~
I;(ficicncy implics t,hat c- ~n~T) and thus f(i, wT, ,S) - ip(i, wl., S) for all i E N.
Now let v E GN be an arbitrary game. As is known, v can be expressed as a weighted
sum of unanimity games:
c for all i E c~(T)
0 else13
v - ~ cTUT.
TCN
(3)
If c-r~ ~ 0 thcn cl~u-1 is monotou~r aud as we pruvcd abovc it holds that f(i, cf~uT, S) -
y~(i, cruT, S) for all i E N.
If cT G 0 then eTUT is not monotone. In that case, by defining cT :- -cT ) O, we
have that cTUT - vo - c~uT, where vo is the null-game, i.e., vo(E) - 0 for all E C N.
Both vo and c~uT are monotone games and thus as proved above
f(i, vo, S) - c,~(i, vo, S) - 0 and f(i, cruT, S) - cp(i, cruT, S) for all i E N.
From additivity of f, 1Z5, and Lhe Shapley value it then follows that for every i E N
f(i, cTUT, S) - f(i, vo, S) - f(i, cr71T, S) --c~(i, cTUT, S)
- -.SÍti(~S(CTUT)) - SÍti(~S(CTUT)) - ~(2,CTUT,s).
VVith (3) and additivity of f and the Shapley value it then follows that
f(2, 77, S) - ~ f(2, CT7L7~, S) -~(~(2, cTU7', S) -(P(2, v, S) for all 2 E N.
TCN TCN
Q.E.D.
Example 3A Cousider the gamc with permission structure (N, v, S), where N-
{ 1, ..., 9}, v- u{s,~} being the monotone unanimity game of {fi, 7} and S: N-. 2N
is given by:
S(1) - {2,3,4}, S(2) - {5}, S(3) - {6,7}, S(4) - {7},
S(5) -{8,9}, S(6) - S(7) - 0, S(8) -{2}, S(9) - 0.- 14
lt is casy to see that
t v, S) s
~( ' - 0 else
Let f: N x GN x SN --~ R be efficient, additive and satisfy the three conditions stated
in Theorem 3.3.
Every h E S(i) U {i}, i E {2,5,8,9} is a dummy player in the game v and thus every
i E {2, 5, 8, 9} is weakly inessential in (N, v, S). Therefore, according to condition
1, f(i, v, S) - 0 for all i E{2, 5, 8, 9} and the relations (1, 2), (2, 5), (5, 8), (5, 9)
and (8, 2) can be deleted without influencing the distribution oí the pay-offs. Thus
f(i, v, S) - f(i, v, S') for all i E~y~ where S' is represented by
Players 6 and 7 are necessary in the game v. From condition 3 it then follows that
there is a constant c) 0 such that
f(i, v, S') - c for i E{6, 7}
and
f(i,v,S') C c for i E {1,3,4}.
}.3y condition 2 it holds that f(i,v,S`) ~ c for i E {3,4}. From conditions 2 and 3 it
thus follows that f(i, v, S') - c, for i E {3, 4}.
I3y the sa~ue conditions it then holds that f(1,v,S') - c.
With condition 1(ii) and efficiency it then follows that
1 for all i E{ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7}
f(i, v, S) - f(i, v, S') -
0 else
~ for all i E{1,3,4,6,7} - a({6,7})
- c,~(i, v, S).-15-
4 Games with acyclic permission structures
Itr this section we focus on games with acyclic permission structures. The conditions
stated in Theorem 3.3 restricted to the class SÁ axiomatize the Conjunctive permis-
sion value on SÁ . We will see that we still carr axiomatize the Conj unctive permission
value for the class of acyclic permission structures by weakening the condition with
respect to inessential players.
Definition 4.1 Let v E GN and S E SN. Playerj E N is strongly inessential in
(N,v,S) if j is a dummy player in the game v and S(j) - 0.
Note that in determiuing whether a player is weakly inessential in a game with per-
mission structure we have to look at the game and the permission structure simulta-
ncously. In determining whcther a player is strongly inessential we can look at the
game and the permission structure separately. Also we remark that if a player is
strongly inessential then he also is weakly inessential.
Theorem 4.2 The allocation rule f: N x GN x SÁ ~ R is equal to the Conjunctive
permission value y~ restricted to the class N x GN x SA if and only if it is efficíent,
addilive and satisfies the following three conditions
1. If v E~N, S E SÁ and j E N is a strongly inessential player in (N, v, S),
then
(~) f(~,v,s) - o:
(ii) for every player i E N it holds that
f(z, v, S) - f(z, ~ S-i).
2. IJ S E Sq and player j E N is such that S(j) ~~, then for every v E ráNy it
holds that
f(~, v, S) ~ max f(i, v, .S)
sES(j)
,?. If r E G~t andj E N ís a nccr,ssary playcr in v, then jor cvery S E SA it holds
thut
f( j, v, S) ~ f( i, v, S) for all i E N'.-16-
PROOF
That ~p is efficient, additive and satisfies conditions 2 and 3 follows directly from
Theorern 3.3.
Lct v E GN, S E SÁ and let j E N be a strongly inessential player in (N, v, S).
Because S( j)- ~ it holds that a(E `{ j})- Q(E) `{ j} for all E C N. But then
7Zs(v)(E) - v(a(E)) - v(a(E)~{j}) - v(a(E~{j}) - R.s(v)(E~{j}) forall E C N.
'I'his implies that
(i) ~p(j,v,S) - Sh;(1Zs(v)) - 0,
(ii) 1Zs(v)(E) - RS-~ (v)( E) for all E C N, and thus ~p(i, v, S) - yo(i, v, S-~) for
a11iEN.
Thus c,~ satisfies condition I.
Now suppose that f: N X~N X SÁ -ti R is effiicient, additive and satisfies the thcee
conditions stated in the theorem.
Like in the proof of Theorem 3.3 consider the games wT - c7.nr, T C N. Again
consider the permission structure S': N-~ 2N which is given by
S'(i) :- S(i) fl ~(T) for all i E N.
I~'irst we show that f(i, wT, S') - f(i, wr, S) for all i E N.
We clairn that if S(N) `a(T) ~ 0 then S(N) `rY(T) contains at least one player
who is strongly inessential in (N,rvT,S). Suppose to the contrary that S(N) `a(T)
does not contain a strongly inessential player. From the fact that each player in
S(N) `a(T) is a dummy player in the game wT and by assumption is not strongly
incsscntial, it follows that S(j) ~ 0 for all j E S(N) `a(T). Furthermore j~~(T)
implies that S(j) fl a(T) - 0. This means that for every j E.S(N) `~(T) there is an
h E S(N) `a(T) such that h E S( j). Thus there exists an infinite sequence of players
(hk)kEN such that hr E S(N)`a(T) and hktr E S(hk)`a(T) for all k E N. Acyclicity
of S implies that all h,k's in this sequence are distinct. But then S(N) `a(T) must
consist of an infinite number of players which contradicts the finiteness of N. Thus
S(N) `a(T) contains at least one strongly inessential player.
Let SI( N, wT, S) denote the collection of all strongly inessential players in ( N, wT, S).
Now we recursively define the following sequence of permission structures Sk: N--~
2N,kEN-17-
S'(z) :- S( )
for all i E N
Sk(2) :- S(i) `Sl(N,w7',Sk-1)
From condition 1(ii) it follows that for every k E N and every i E N there is some
constant c; E R such that f(i, wT, .Sk) - c;. From the discussion above and finiteness
of N it follows that there is some M G oo such that Sk(N) `a!(T) - ~ for every
k~ M. Furthermore, if i E a(T) then i ~ SI(N, wT, Sk) because Sk(i) ~~ for every
i E a(T) and every k E N. Therefore Sk - S' for all k 1 M and thus
f(i, wT, S) - f( i, wr, S`) for all i E N. (4)
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 it follows from conditions 2 and 3 that there
is some constant c~ 0 such that f (i, wT, S') - c for all i E a(T).
If i E N`a(T) then i is strongly inessenti~,l in (N,wT,S') and thus by condition 1
(i) f(i, wT, S') - 0 for all i E N~ a(T).
With (4) and efficiency it then follows that
- r `T for all i E cY(T)
f(z, wT, S) - f(z , wT, S` ) Sl ~Q(T)
0 else.
Ilcnc~~, f( i, i~r~', .4) - y~(i, ~u-~~, S) for all i E N.
If v E G`v then we can prove that f(i, v, S) - y~(i, v, S) for all i E N using additivity
in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Q.E.D.
Example 4.3 Consider the game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, S) where
N- { 1, ..., 9}, v- u{6,7} and S: N-~ 2N is given by
S(1) - {2,3,4}, S(2) - {5,8}, S(3) - {6,7}, S(4) - {7},
S(5) -{8,9}, s(s) - s(7) - s(8) - s(9) - 0.
t, ,Is
This is the same permission structure as in Exarnple 3.4, except that the dominance
relation between players 2 and 8 is in the opposite direction. Suppose that the
allocation rule J: N x CJN x S,~ -~ R is e(rcient, additive and satisfies the three
conditions stated in Theorem 4.2. Players 8 and 9 are strongly inessential in (N, v, S).
Deleting the relations with them results in the following permission structure S2
In the new garne with permission structure (N, v, SZ), besides players 8 and 9, player
5 also ís strongly inessential and deleting the relations with player 5 results in the
permission structure 53. In (N, v, S3) player 2 also is inessential. If the relations
with player 2 also are deleted then no player has a strongly inessential player as a
successor anymore. The resulting permissíon structure S' is
. 5
This is the same S' as in F,xample 3.4 and the players 2, 5, 8 and 9 all are strongly
inessential in (N, v, S`). Condition 1(i) now implies that f(i, v, S`) - 0 for all
i E {2,5,8,9}.
Similarly as in Example 3.4 it follows that there is some constant c E R such that
f(i, v, S') - c for all i E{ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7}.
From condition I(ii) it then follows that
f(i, v, S) - f( í, v, S~) - f(i, v, S3) - f(i, v, S') for all i E N.
Efficiency then implies that-19-
{ ' '- for all i E{1,3,4,6,7} - a({6,7})
J(2i vi S) - f(2v vi ~Sw)
- 5
0 else
- ~P(r, v~ S)~
In the following theorem we axiomatize the Conjunctive permission value for games
with acyclic permission structures by replacing the condition with respect to inessen-
tial players by some boundary condition.
Theorem 4.4 The allocation rule f: N x~N x SÁ ~ R is equal to the Conjunctive
perrnission value ~p reslricted to the class N x~N x Sq if and only if it is e~cient,
cedditive and satisfies the followirzg three conditions for every v E~,Ny and S E SA :
1. For every player i E N it holds that
0 C f(i, v, S) C C(S(i) U{i}, v),
where for every E C N, C(E, v) :- mN(v(F) - v(F `E)).




~3. If j E N is a necessary player in v then
f(j, v, S) ~ f( i, v, S) for all i E N.
PROOF
'I'hat y~ is efHcient, additive and satisfies conditions 2 and 3 follows directly from
Theorem 3.3.
Let v E~h and S E SA . Since Rs(v) E~,~ it holds that cp(i, v, S) - Sh;(7Zs(v)) 1 0.
From the definition of the Shapley value it follows that Sh;(v) C C({i},v) for all
i E N. But. then it, follows from Proposition 3.2 that
~(i,v,S) - .Sh;(1Zs(v)) C C({ }, Rs(~'))
- ~3X (~s(ti')(E) - ~s(v)(E ` {i}))- 20
- E3X (v(a(E)) - v(o(E` {i}))
- Ë~x (v(Q(E)) - v(a(E) ~ (S(i) U {i}~)
C m~x (v(E) - v(E ~[S(ti) U {i}])) - C(S(i) U {i}, v) for all i E N.
max (v(E) - v(E ~ S(i) U {i}))
EEo(E)
Thus cp satisfies condition 1.
Now suppose that f: N x CN x SÁ -~ R is effiicient, additive and satisfies the three
conditions stated in the theorc~m.
Again consider the monotone game wr - cTCIT, T C N, cT ) 0, and let S be an
acyclic pcrnrission structure on N.
Similarly as in the previous proves it follows from conditions 2 and 3 that there is
some constant c~ 0 such that f(i, wT, S) - c for all i E a(T).
If i E N~a(T) then [S(i)U{i}]f1T -[~1. This implies that wT(E)-wT(E~[S(i)U{i}]) -
0 for all E C N and thus C,(S(i) U{i},wT) - 0. With condition 1 it then follows
that f( i, wT, S) - 0 for all i E N`a(T).
With efficiency it follows that
f(2, 7UT, s) - 1 ~a(T)
Ill 0 else
Hence, f(i., wT, S) - cp(i, wT, S) for all i E N.
If v E GN then we can prove that f( i, v, S) - y~(i, v, S) for all i E N using additivity
in the sarne way as in the proof of Thcorem 3.3.
Q.E.D.
Example 4.5 Consider the same game with permission structure as in F.xample 4.3.
rlpplication of condition 1 directly yields that
f(i, v, S) - 0 for all i E {2, 5, 8, 9}
`r for all i E c~(T)
Conditions 2 and '3 then Icad to-21-
f( i, v, 5') - c, for i E{ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7}
With efficiency it then follows that
( r
.f(~~v,S) - Jll s
0
for all i E{ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7} - c~({6, 7})
else
- ~p(i, v, .S).
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